COMPANY PROFILE / SPACE INDUSTRY
ispace
A Japanese company that has twice tried to deliver cargo to the Moon, and is now merging its landers and turning to lunar-orbit satellites
ispace is a Tokyo company that develops landers that carry cargo (payloads) to the Moon, and rovers that drive on its surface. It attempted lunar landings in 2023 and 2025, but neither ended in a soft landing (setting down gently). In March 2026, after an independent review of the failures known as the "Seven Recommendations", it decided to merge the landers it had been building separately in Japan and the United States into a new model called "ULTRA", and announced a concept for a communications and positioning service run from satellites orbiting the Moon. This profile sets out what role the company plays in space, what it has committed, who it works with and what it is aiming for, using only its securities report and official company and government material.
- ispace in 30 seconds, and where it stands in the space industry
- The logo and how the name is written
- Where the company sits in the space industry
- Scale
- Resources committed to space
- What it has done so far
- What comes next
- What the company is aiming for in space
- Map of partnerships in the space industry
- Technologies, products and services
- The risks this company carries
- Glossary / References / Claim-to-source audit
1. ispace in 30 seconds, and where it stands in the space industry
Chuo-ku, TokyoMoved in March 2026. The mission control centre is in Nihonbashi
Satellites, in orbit (secondary)The secondary type is a concept only (execution not yet confirmed)
2028 (company plan)Awaiting approval from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Not yet confirmed
Companies in the space industry are easiest to understand when sorted into four kinds: those that launch rockets, those that go to the Moon or space stations, those that run satellites and services in orbit, and those that build spacecraft parts and systems (Fig. 1 below). ispace is one that goes to the Moon: it develops its own lander and earns freight charges by carrying other people's cargo. According to its securities report, the freight is priced per kilogram of payload, and payment begins one to three years before launch Sourced. So most of the freight revenue is hard to book as sales until the lander is built and actually reaches the Moon, which is a distinctive feature of this company. That is why its results show, alongside revenue, a reference figure called "project revenue" that adds government subsidies (such as the SBIR subsidy). The way its revenue has to be read is a little unusual, and that is the first caution when reading ispace.
2. The logo and how the name is written
The logo is the company's trademark. We have not recreated it with generated images; we placed the image taken from the official website as img/ispace_logo.svg.
Note on naming: the company writes its name in lower case, ispace (the English name in its securities report is ispace, inc.). The U.S. subsidiary is ispace technologies U.S., inc. and the European (Luxembourg) subsidiary is ispace EUROPE S.A.; the party to the U.S. NASA contract is the U.S. subsidiary. "HAKUTO-R" was the name of the technology-demonstration programme covering Missions 1 and 2, whose end was announced in December 2025.
Official site: https://ispace-inc.com/3. Where the company sits in the space industry
First, two terms. A lander is a spacecraft that descends slowly to the surface of the Moon or another body and sets down. A payload is the "cargo" that a rocket or lander carries: experiment equipment, small rovers, instruments from companies. ispace builds the lander and delivers other people's payloads to the Moon, in effect a courier service to the Moon.
The Moon has no air, so a parachute is useless. A lander must slow itself using engine thrust alone and set down at a chosen spot. It descends while measuring, with sensors such as a laser, how high above the surface it is. If something goes wrong with that height measurement, the vehicle may think it has already arrived, or may be unable to slow in time. In ispace's two attempts, the company's own analysis names a software error in the height estimate in the first, and an anomaly in a height sensor, the laser range finder, in the second (section 6) Sourced. For the technical details of landers, see our explainers on lunar exploration and Artemis, and on rocket engines and propellants.
4. Scale
As a listed company, its scale can be checked in statutory filings Sourced. The fiscal year ends in March, and amounts are consolidated, in millions of yen.
| Measure (¥ million) | Year to March 2025 | Year to March 2026 | Year to March 2027 (company forecast) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 4,743 | 3,307 | 3,300 |
| Project revenue (company reference figure) | 4,971 | 5,890 | 9,000 |
| Operating loss | (9,795) | (11,580) | (17,700) |
| Net loss attributable to owners of the parent | (11,945) | (8,152) | (13,000) |
| R&D expense (booked in administrative expenses) | 7,731 | 3,929 | Not disclosed |
| Total assets | 27,189 | 47,704 | - |
| Net assets | 7,007 | 15,173 | - |
| Cash and cash equivalents (period end) | 13,117 | 29,690 | - |
| Employees (consolidated) | End of March 2025 | End of March 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| Staff | 317 | 333 |
| Temporary staff (annual average) | 18 | 26 |
"Project revenue" is a company-defined reference figure: accounting revenue plus government subsidies (such as the SBIR subsidy) that are booked as non-operating income Sourced. The company explains that it shows this because the accounting treatment of contracts with governments is not uniform; it is not audited revenue. The figures for the year to March 2027 are the company's forecast, not confirmed numbers Not yet confirmed. In its earnings summary the company also notes that, because of continuing operating losses and negative operating cash flow, "events or conditions exist that raise significant doubt about the company's ability to continue as a going concern". It adds that, because countermeasures are being carried out, it judges that "no material uncertainty about the going-concern assumption" exists Sourced. This article does not give investment advice and reports what the company wrote.
5. Resources committed to space
The table shows whether primary sources confirm four things: people, money, outside investments and acquisitions, and contracts with public bodies.
| Type of resource | What could be confirmed | Status |
|---|---|---|
| People | 333 consolidated (end of March 2026), of whom about 200 are engineers on lander development and operations. Sites: Tokyo (headquarters and the mission control centre in Nihonbashi), Denver, Colorado (U.S. subsidiary, lander development) and Luxembourg (European subsidiary, rover development). Procedures have also begun to set up a subsidiary in Saudi Arabia | Sourced |
| Money: R&D | ¥3,929 million in the year to March 2026 (¥1,666 million at the parent, ¥1,840 million at the U.S. subsidiary, ¥423 million at the European subsidiary). ¥7,731 million in the year to March 2025 | Sourced |
| Money: capital spending | ¥2,070 million in the year to March 2026 (including software). Mainly communications relay satellites tied to the lunar-orbit satellite service (Mission 2.5) and Mission 5, and the headquarters move | Sourced |
| Money: funding | New share issues since listing total about ¥59.8 billion at the time of the report (the October to November 2025 public offering and third-party allotment were up to ¥18.2 billion). Loan agreements since founding total about ¥50.6 billion (in the year to March 2026: ¥10.0 billion from Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and ¥5.0 billion from Mizuho Bank). Financing cash flow in the year to March 2026 was an inflow of ¥31,447 million | Sourced |
| Outside investments, acquisitions, joint ventures, disposals | The securities report records no acquisitions, joint ventures or business disposals. What could be confirmed is the setting up of subsidiaries (U.S. 2016, Luxembourg 2017, a Japanese operations company 2021, and a Saudi Arabian subsidiary now being set up) | Could not confirm |
| Contracts and links with public bodies | NASA (CLPS task order CP-12; the U.S. subsidiary was selected as part of Team Draper), the SBIR subsidy of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (¥12.0 billion grant decision, December 2023), the Space Strategy Fund (first round: sensing for lunar water resources; second round: precision landing in the lunar polar region), ESA (MAGPIE) and JAXA (technical support, and a 2021 payload transport contract). The amounts are caps or expectations, separate from confirmed or received amounts (details in the table below) | Sourced |
| Start-up investments and university links | A subcontract with the Institute of Science Tokyo (lead institution for the first-round Space Strategy Fund project) and payload contracts with institutions such as a Taiwanese university were confirmed. We could not confirm any investment cases | Sourced (investments: could not confirm) |
Public funding at a glance (checked 17 October 2026)
| Scheme or contract | Content | Type of amount | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| SBIR subsidy (METI) | "Development and operational demonstration of lunar landers". Mission 3 is covered. SBIR is a Japanese government programme that supports research and development by small businesses | ¥12.0 billion (notice of grant decision, December 2023) | The programme period is in principle to fiscal 2027. Mission 3 is now expected in 2028, and the plan change awaits METI approval |
| Space Strategy Fund, round 1 | "Technology for exploring lunar water resources". The Institute of Science Tokyo is lead institution, ispace a core partner (developing, launching and operating the satellite). The Space Strategy Fund is a Japanese government fund of about ¥1 trillion over ten years | Support cap ¥6.4 billion; the most ispace expects to receive is ¥4.7 billion (not confirmed) | Selected April 2025 |
| Space Strategy Fund, round 2 | "Precision landing technology in the lunar polar region". Linked to Mission 4 | Support cap of up to ¥20.0 billion (varies with stage-gate reviews; receipt of the full amount is not confirmed) | Selected January 2026 |
| NASA CLPS CP-12 | Selected as part of Team Draper. The U.S.-led Mission 5 | We could not confirm the contract value from the primary sources we read | Launch moved to 2030. Execution of CP-12 on the new schedule awaits formal NASA approval |
| ESA MAGPIE | Assumes a contract for rover development and payload transport | ESA has set aside the equivalent of ¥11.9 billion for phase 2 (converted to yen by the company; the contract is yet to be signed) | Pre-contract |
Status of main vehicles, missions and products (checked 17 October 2026)
| Vehicle or mission | Type | Main specifications (company's stated values) | Record | Stage and date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mission 1 (Series 1 lander) | Lunar lander | About 12.43 kg of payloads in total (actual) | Launched in December 2022. In the landing sequence on 26 April 2023 (Japan time), the lander estimated its altitude as zero while about 5 km up, and the company's analysis says it free-fell after running out of propellant. It completed milestones up to the eighth (Success 8) | Achieved (no soft landing) | Ref. 1, 3 |
| Mission 2 (RESILIENCE lander) | Lunar lander | Up to 30 kg of payloads. Actual: 10.5 kg | Launched in January 2025. In the landing on 6 June 2025 (Japan time), the company's analysis attributes a hard landing to an anomaly in the laser range finder (LRF). It ruled out anomalies in software, propulsion and power | Achieved (no soft landing) | Ref. 1, 4 |
| Mission 2.5 | Lunar-orbit satellite (communications) | One satellite. Uses the transport service of Argo Space Corp. (U.S.) | None yet | Plan (earliest 2027; Not yet confirmed) | Ref. 1 |
| Mission 3 (ULTRA lander) | Lunar lander | Up to 200 kg of payloads (the company aims to raise this to about 500 kg later) | Vibration testing since June 2026. Manufacture of the flight vehicle is to start after the tests | In development (2028 planned; awaiting METI approval; Not yet confirmed) | Ref. 1 |
| Mission 4 | Lunar lander (precision landing near the south pole) | None given | None yet | Plan (2029; Not yet confirmed) | Ref. 1 |
| Mission 5 (Team Draper Commercial Mission 1) | Lunar lander (NASA contract) | None given | U.S.-led. Formerly Mission 3 | Plan (reset to 2030; awaiting NASA approval; Not yet confirmed) | Ref. 1, 2 |
| Rover TENACIOUS | Lunar rover | None given (developed by the European subsidiary) | None yet | In development (Not yet confirmed) | Ref. 1 |
The securities report says little that touches materials and parts directly (we could not confirm the propulsion alloys or structural materials used). It does describe design philosophy Sourced. First, the policy is to use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) parts, such as ordinary electronic components, to cut cost. Radiation and temperature swings in space damage electronics, so the use of COTS parts trades some reliability for price (see our explainers on space semiconductors and COTS, and on radiation and electronic parts). Second, the idea is to use several small engines controlled by software to get the same thrust, rather than develop one large engine. Third, after the Mission 2 failure, the recommendations include reviewing how vendors (parts suppliers) are selected and adding test resources. The lesson to be read from the two failures is that, in a small vehicle, the performance of a single sensor (the laser range finder) can decide the mission, so evaluating materials and parts is an especially important issue for this company.
6. What it has done so far
| When | What happened | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| September 2010 | Takeshi Hakamada set up the company's predecessor (a limited liability company, White Label Space Japan). It aimed to develop a lunar rover and to enter the private lunar exploration race "Google Lunar XPRIZE" | A company that started from rover development |
| 2018 | Launched the "HAKUTO-R" programme and announced a plan to launch as a rideshare on SpaceX's Falcon 9 | Moving into the lander business |
| July 2022 | The U.S. subsidiary was selected as part of Team Draper for NASA CLPS CP-12 | An entry point to NASA's lunar delivery contracts |
| December 2022 | Launched Mission 1 (Cape Canaveral, Florida) | - |
| April 2023 | Mission 1 landing sequence (26 April, Japan time). No soft landing. In its analysis of 26 May 2023, the company said the most likely reason was that the altitude-estimation software did not perform as expected (a contributing factor was changing the landing site after the design review of February 2021) | The company's own analysis, not a regulator's. It said the cause was identified and would be reflected in Mission 2 and later |
| 12 April 2023 | Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Growth Market | A way to raise capital |
| December 2023 | Selected for the SBIR subsidy (notice of a ¥12.0 billion grant decision) | Development funded by the government |
| January 2025 | Launched Mission 2 ("SMBC x HAKUTO-R VENTURE MOON") | - |
| June 2025 | Mission 2 landing (6 June, Japan time). A hard landing. In its analysis of 24 June 2025, the company said the technical cause was an anomaly in the laser range finder (LRF) hardware, and that deterioration in flight, or performance lower than expected from the start, was highly likely | The causes differ: software the first time, hardware the second |
| October to November 2025 | Public offering and third-party allotment (up to ¥18.2 billion) | Fundraising continued after the two failures |
| December 2025 | Announced the end of the HAKUTO-R programme, on the expiry of contracts with all 22 partner companies | The framework for Missions 1 and 2 closed |
| March 2026 | Received the "Seven Recommendations" from the independent "improvement task force". Announced the merger of its Japanese and U.S. lander models into "ULTRA", and began studying the "Lunar Connect Service" using lunar-orbit satellites. Moved headquarters to Nihonbashi-Honcho | Business strategy and schedule reset |
Outside experts investigated the causes of the failures using a systems-theory causal analysis method (CAST). The recommendations fall into three levels Sourced. Operations: introduce terrain-relative navigation (TRN), in which the vehicle works out its position by looking at the terrain, and use the remaining fuel during the landing operation. System development: improve vendor selection, increase test resources, and design and verify fault detection, isolation and recovery (FDIR). Management decisions: closer work with partners, and stronger corporate risk management. The company says it plans to implement concrete measures in later missions. The full text of the recommendations is not in the primary sources we read; the above is the securities report's summary.
7. What comes next
In its securities report the company writes that from Mission 4 onward it aims for two missions a year, and over the medium to long term three, and that it plans to put at least five of its own lunar-orbit satellites into orbit by 2030 Sourced. All of these are company plans and can change with development delays, approvals and funding Not yet confirmed.
None of the following is firmly stated in the primary sources we read Not yet confirmed.
The launch dates (day and month) of Missions 3 to 5 / when NASA approval for Mission 5 might come / the contract value of CP-12 / the price and start date of the Lunar Connect Service / the specifics of the technical support from JAXA. Dates and amounts in news coverage cannot be confirmed from primary sources and are not used here.
8. What the company is aiming for in space
This section includes points the company does not state directly. We set them out as inferences that can be read from primary sources, with the basis for each.
| What can be read | Primary basis | Status |
|---|---|---|
| The aim is to widen from "a company whose income swings on landing success" to one that owns communications and positioning services linking the Moon and Earth | The securities report states the start of study of the "Lunar Connect Service" using its own lunar-orbit satellites, with a plan for five by 2030 | Sourced (company policy) |
| After two landing failures, it has switched to management that puts quality and development efficiency first | Following the "Seven Recommendations", it adopted the merged "ULTRA" lander and a structure that gathers development under the CTO | Sourced (company policy) |
| For now the business has a strong character of development supported by public money (subsidies and funds) | The company explains that subsidy income such as SBIR made up a considerable share of income in the year to March 2026 | Inference |
| Mission 3 will be the first test of a "commercial lander" for the company | The securities report positions Mission 3 as the first mission to use a commercial lander | Sourced |
The securities report lists as a risk that, because ULTRA is planned to carry more sellable weight (the amount of cargo it can take) and revenue than RESILIENCE, any problem with it could hurt earnings more severely Sourced. It also says that merging Japanese and U.S. development involves design integration and review of parts procurement, which may create new risks. From this we read that the company is making a bet: to scale up while unifying its route to quality Not yet confirmed.
9. Map of partnerships in the space industry
10. Technologies, products and services
The source of ispace's income is its payload service: carrying cargo to the Moon. The illustration below is our arrangement, based on the securities report's description, of how payments arrive.
| Category | Content (company's description) | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Payload service | Carries customers' cargo to the lunar surface or to lunar orbit. The company's base prices are US$1.5 million/kg to the surface on a lander, US$0.5 million/kg to lunar orbit, and US$3.5 million/kg on a rover (company-set prices at the date of the report). The company also writes that "no established price level exists" | Sourced (company's stated values) |
| Lander | RESILIENCE: up to 30 kg. ULTRA: up to 200 kg (later about 500 kg). Designed for uncrewed (robotic) missions | Sourced (company's stated values). ULTRA: Not yet confirmed |
| Rover | TENACIOUS (developed by the European subsidiary). A contract with ESA's MAGPIE for development and transport is assumed | Sourced (contract: Not yet confirmed) |
| Data service | Providing data gathered on the lunar surface or in lunar orbit. A subscription-based lunar database is envisaged from 2028 onward | Not yet confirmed |
| Lunar-orbit satellites and the Lunar Connect Service | A concept to use its own lunar-orbit satellites to provide communications and positioning to customers on the surface and in lunar orbit. At least five by 2030. The company says ground stations on the Earth side are key | Not yet confirmed |
In a payload service each item of cargo has different requirements for temperature, vibration, radiation, power and communications, so the lander must be adjusted to each payload's specification. The securities report lists actual cargo that includes a solid-state battery (NGK Spark Plug, Mission 1), a water electrolysis unit for the Moon (Takasago Thermal Engineering, Mission 2), a microalgae culture device (euglena Co., Ltd., Mission 2), and a Raman spectrometer and a mass spectrometer (Mission 3 and later) Sourced. The purpose of all of these is to demonstrate materials and devices working through the Moon's large day-night temperature swings and radiation. We could not confirm the operating result of the Mission 1 solid-state battery from the primary sources we read (for the materials, see our explainers on the space environment and its effects on materials, and on batteries for space).
11. The risks this company carries
| Risk | Content | Status |
|---|---|---|
| No soft landing yet | Neither attempt ended in a soft landing. The next mission's result is a precondition for the business. On insurance, the company received insurance money for Mission 1, but Mission 2 was outside the scope of cover and none was received | Sourced |
| Going-concern assumption | The earnings summary notes that "events or conditions exist that raise significant doubt". The company judges that, given countermeasures, "no material uncertainty" exists | Sourced |
| Continuing and widening losses | Operating loss was ¥11,580 million in the year to March 2026. The company's forecast for the year to March 2027 is an operating loss of ¥17,700 million, with losses widening as foreign exchange gains drop away and with Mission 5 costs | Sourced (forecast: Not yet confirmed) |
| Schedule slips | Mission 3 was agreed with METI and the SBIR office for 2027, but the internal plan is now 2028. Mission 5 was reset from 2027 to 2030 | Sourced |
| Reliance on, and variability of, public funds | The SBIR subsidy and the Space Strategy Fund make up a considerable share of income. The Space Strategy Fund amounts can vary with stage-gate reviews. A plan change needs METI approval | Sourced |
| Concentrating on a new vehicle | Because ULTRA is planned to carry more sellable weight and revenue, a problem would hurt earnings more. The company also points to delay risks from design integration and procurement review | Sourced |
| Continued fundraising | Development relies on share issues (about ¥59.8 billion in total) and loans (about ¥50.6 billion in total). The company says it will consider flexible fundraising going forward | Sourced |
| Treatment of customers' prepayments | Part of the price is prepaid and non-refundable under company policy, but some customer contracts make the treatment on mission failure a condition. The Mission 5 contract terms are to be revised because of the schedule change | Sourced |
| Uncertainty in the lunar-orbit satellite business | A new field, where demand and profitability may not match expectations. The company notes that the first transport to lunar orbit may bring problems different from those of Missions 1 and 2 | Sourced |
12. Glossary
- Lander
- A spacecraft that makes a soft landing (sets down gently) on the Moon or another body.
- Payload
- The cargo a spacecraft carries, such as experiment equipment or rovers.
- Rover
- A vehicle that drives across the lunar surface to explore it.
- Soft landing / hard landing
- A soft landing is a gentle touchdown at reduced speed. A hard landing is one where speed is not reduced enough, close to a crash.
- LRF
- Laser range finder. A sensor that measures distance and altitude with a laser.
- CLPS
- Commercial Lunar Payload Services. A NASA programme that buys delivery of cargo to the Moon from commercial landers.
- SBIR
- Small Business Innovation Research. Here, a Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) subsidy that supports R&D by small businesses.
- Space Strategy Fund
- A Japanese government fund, aiming at about ¥1 trillion over ten years, for space technology development.
- Stage-gate review
- A review at each milestone of development that decides whether to continue and at what amount.
- Lunar orbit
- An orbit around the Moon. It can be used to relay communications between the lunar surface and Earth.
- Project revenue
- A reference figure shown by ispace: revenue plus subsidies booked as non-operating income.
- COTS parts
- Commercial off-the-shelf parts. Cheaper than space-specific parts.
- Securities Report (yuka shoken hokokusho)
- The annual statutory disclosure that listed companies in Japan file with the government. It is published through EDINET.
13. References
- ispace, inc. Securities Report for the 16th fiscal year (year to March 2026), filed with the Director-General of the Kanto Local Finance Bureau on 25 June 2026 (EDINET document ID S100YL5W; in Japanese). Business description, history, the course of Missions 1 and 2, future missions, funding, public funds, R&D expense, capital spending, employees, risks. https://disclosure2dl.edinet-fsa.go.jp/searchdocument/pdf/S100YL5W.pdf
- ispace, inc. Consolidated Financial Results for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 2026 (Japanese GAAP) (15 May 2026; in Japanese). Results, financial position, the forecast for the year to March 2027, the explanation of project revenue, the going-concern note. https://www.ispace-inc.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/2026%E5%B9%B4%EF%BC%93%E6%9C%88%E6%9C%9F-%E6%B1%BA%E7%AE%97%E7%9F%AD%E4%BF%A1%E3%80%94%E6%97%A5%E6%9C%AC%E5%9F%BA%E6%BA%96%E3%80%95%EF%BC%88%E9%80%A3%E7%B5%90%EF%BC%89.pdf
- ispace, inc. Press release "ispace Announces Results of the “HAKUTO-R” Mission 1 Lunar Landing" (26 May 2023). Analysis of the Mission 1 landing sequence. https://www.ispace-inc.com/2023/05/26/ispace-announces-results-of-the-hakuto-r-mission-1-lunar-landing/
- ispace, inc. Press release "ispace Releases Technical Cause Analysis for HAKUTO-R Mission 2" (24 June 2025). Analysis of the Mission 2 landing sequence and countermeasures. https://www.ispace-inc.com/2025/06/24/ispace-releases-technical-cause-analysis-for-hakuto-r-mission-2/
- ispace Official website (source of the logo). https://ispace-inc.com/
14. Claim-to-source audit
| Claim in the text | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Legal name, English name, head office, founding, listing date, subsidiary structure | Sourced | Reference 1 https://disclosure2dl.edinet-fsa.go.jp/searchdocument/pdf/S100YL5W.pdf |
| Revenue, project revenue, operating loss, net loss, total assets, cash (years to March 2025 and 2026) | Sourced | Reference 2 https://www.ispace-inc.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/2026%E5%B9%B4%EF%BC%93%E6%9C%88%E6%9C%9F-%E6%B1%BA%E7%AE%97%E7%9F%AD%E4%BF%A1%E3%80%94%E6%97%A5%E6%9C%AC%E5%9F%BA%E6%BA%96%E3%80%95%EF%BC%88%E9%80%A3%E7%B5%90%EF%BC%89.pdf |
| Company forecast for the year to March 2027 (project revenue ¥9,000 million, operating loss ¥17,700 million, and so on) | Not yet confirmed | Reference 2 https://www.ispace-inc.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/2026%E5%B9%B4%EF%BC%93%E6%9C%88%E6%9C%9F-%E6%B1%BA%E7%AE%97%E7%9F%AD%E4%BF%A1%E3%80%94%E6%97%A5%E6%9C%AC%E5%9F%BA%E6%BA%96%E3%80%95%EF%BC%88%E9%80%A3%E7%B5%90%EF%BC%89.pdf |
| The going-concern note, and the judgement that no material uncertainty exists | Sourced | Reference 2 https://www.ispace-inc.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/2026%E5%B9%B4%EF%BC%93%E6%9C%88%E6%9C%9F-%E6%B1%BA%E7%AE%97%E7%9F%AD%E4%BF%A1%E3%80%94%E6%97%A5%E6%9C%AC%E5%9F%BA%E6%BA%96%E3%80%95%EF%BC%88%E9%80%A3%E7%B5%90%EF%BC%89.pdf |
| Employees (333 consolidated, 26 temporary), about 200 engineers, R&D expense, capital spending | Sourced | Reference 1 https://disclosure2dl.edinet-fsa.go.jp/searchdocument/pdf/S100YL5W.pdf |
| Funding (about ¥59.8 billion in shares, about ¥50.6 billion in loans), the ¥12.0 billion SBIR subsidy, the Space Strategy Fund, ESA MAGPIE, NASA CP-12 | Sourced | Reference 1 https://disclosure2dl.edinet-fsa.go.jp/searchdocument/pdf/S100YL5W.pdf |
| The Mission 1 landing sequence (26 April 2023, about 5 km altitude, software as the most likely cause) | Sourced | Reference 3 https://www.ispace-inc.com/2023/05/26/ispace-announces-results-of-the-hakuto-r-mission-1-lunar-landing/ |
| The Mission 2 landing (6 June 2025, LRF hardware anomaly, no anomaly in software, propulsion or power) | Sourced | Reference 4 https://www.ispace-inc.com/2025/06/24/ispace-releases-technical-cause-analysis-for-hakuto-r-mission-2/ |
| Launch timing of Missions 1 and 2 (December 2022, January 2025), payload masses, the end of HAKUTO-R, the Seven Recommendations, the ULTRA merger | Sourced | Reference 1 https://disclosure2dl.edinet-fsa.go.jp/searchdocument/pdf/S100YL5W.pdf |
| Base payload prices (US$1.5 million/kg to the surface, US$0.5 million to lunar orbit, US$3.5 million on a rover) and lander capacity | Sourced (company's stated values) | Reference 1 https://disclosure2dl.edinet-fsa.go.jp/searchdocument/pdf/S100YL5W.pdf |
| Timing of Missions 2.5 to 5, the Lunar Connect Service, the data service | Not yet confirmed | Reference 1 https://disclosure2dl.edinet-fsa.go.jp/searchdocument/pdf/S100YL5W.pdf |
| The four company types in Fig. 1 | Our calculation | Our own arrangement (companies shown are examples from this series) |
| Launch dates (day and month) of Missions 3 to 5, the CP-12 contract value, the price and start of the Lunar Connect Service, the specifics of JAXA support | Not yet confirmed | Outlook: not firmly stated in the primary sources we read. Figures from news reports are not used |
| Whether any acquisitions, joint ventures or investments exist | Not yet confirmed | Outlook: we could not find them in the securities report. We do not claim they do not exist |
| The specific propulsion or structural materials, and the operating result of the Mission 1 solid-state battery | Not yet confirmed | Outlook: not stated in the primary sources we read |
| The reading of the aims (widening to communications and positioning services, a quality-first management) | Inference | Our own interpretation (basis: References 1 and 2) |
| The reading that development relies heavily on public money | Inference | Our own interpretation (from the earnings summary's explanation) |
| The reading that ULTRA is a concentrated bet | Inference | Our own interpretation (from the securities report's risk statements) |
Last updated: 17 October 2026 / Troy Technical
The figures in this article are based on the securities report and earnings summary that ispace, inc. filed in Japan, and on the company's official press releases. We have not used market-research estimates or figures that appear only in press coverage. Passages marked "Inference" are our reading of primary information, not statements by the company. Share prices, valuations and investment judgements are not discussed.