INSTITUTION PROFILE / QUANTUM COMPUTING
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology)
The U.S. body that sets standards for cryptography that quantum computers should not be able to break. Its binding force reaches only federal information systems
NIST is a federal research agency inside the U.S. Department of Commerce. It does not build quantum computers, and it does not regulate them. It plays two main roles in quantum computing. The first is to write the standards for cryptography designed to resist future quantum computers (post-quantum cryptography, or PQC). The second is to research quantum measurement and to help convene the quantum industry. The standards are mandatory for U.S. government information systems but carry no legal obligation for private companies or other countries. Even so, guidance from other countries, such as the UK, refers to them, which makes NIST an international reference point. This profile looks at one question: how much influence NIST actually has over quantum computing. Each standard is labeled as final, draft or in development, with a check date (15 October 2026).
- NIST in 30 seconds
- What kind of body it is: the four types of influence
- What it does for quantum computing
- How far its influence reaches (powers and geography)
- Companies and organizations it works with
- Outlook
- Glossary, references and claim-to-source audit
1. NIST in 30 seconds
NIST's PQC standards have two faces: mandatory for U.S. federal information systems, voluntary for everyone else. The text of FIPS 203 says the standard applies to federal information systems but does not apply to national security systems, and that private and commercial organizations may adopt it Sourced. It also says the Secretary of Commerce is the approving authority, and that the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) does not allow waivers for standards the Secretary makes mandatory Sourced. So NIST decides what to use, but has no power to make private companies use it. Its influence is still large, because the standards also apply to contractors that operate information systems on behalf of federal agencies, and because guidance from other countries, such as the UK, points to the same algorithms.
Much of the cryptography that protects communications and digital signatures today relies on one fact: it is very hard to split a huge number back into its prime factors. NIST explains that a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could break cryptography that relies on this fact in a short time Sourced. NIST also says the field is still in its infancy and that it is an open question how powerful quantum computers can become. So researchers developed cryptography that relies on other kinds of math that are hard for both today's computers and quantum computers. This is post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Of the first four algorithms NIST selected, three are based on a family of math problems called structured lattices, and one is based on hash functions Sourced. This article does not describe how to break cryptography. It covers only who decides on the standards and whom they reach.
2. What kind of body it is: the four types of influence
Unlike companies, the "institutions" in quantum computing articles do not build quantum computers themselves. They fall into four types, depending on the route by which they influence the industry.
3. What it does for quantum computing
3-1. Post-quantum cryptography standards (with their status)
NIST invited candidate algorithms from around the world in 2016, then spent years evaluating them before turning them into standards Sourced. "Standard" covers different things here: final versions, drafts, and algorithms that have been selected but whose documents are not yet published. The table shows the status as of the check date (15 October 2026).
| Standard or document | Status and date | What it contains | Binding force |
|---|---|---|---|
| FIPS 203 ML-KEM (key encapsulation) | Final. Published 13 August 2024 and effective on publication. A note dated 17 November 2025 says an issue will be corrected in a future revision | A way for two parties to create a shared secret key over a public channel. Three strength levels (ML-KEM-512, 768 and 1024). The standard says ML-KEM "is believed to be secure, even against adversaries who possess a quantum computer" | Applies to federal information systems. National security systems are excluded |
| FIPS 204 ML-DSA (digital signatures) | Final. Published 13 August 2024. A note dated 31 July 2026 says several minor issues will be corrected in a future revision | A digital signature method, used to confirm identity and detect tampering (lattice-based) | Same as above |
| FIPS 205 SLH-DSA (hash-based signatures) | Final. Published 13 August 2024 | A second digital signature method. It is based on hash functions, so it relies on different math from the lattice-based ML-DSA | Same as above |
| FIPS 206 (signature derived from FALCON) | In development. No draft appears in the CSRC list of FIPS on the check date | NIST's page says FALCON was selected and will be published as FIPS 206 | Not yet confirmed |
| HQC (another key-establishment method) | Selected on 11 March 2025. No standard document appears in the list on the check date | One of the key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). Standardization is under way to add it alongside ML-KEM. The reasons for the selection are in NIST IR 8545 | Not yet confirmed |
| SP 800-227 (using key encapsulation) | Final. 18 September 2025 | Recommendations on the definitions, properties and secure use of key-encapsulation mechanisms | Guidance (a Special Publication) |
| SP 800-230 (extra SLH-DSA parameter sets) | Draft. Released 13 April 2026. Comments closed 12 June 2026 | Additional settings of SLH-DSA for uses where the number of signatures is limited | A draft, so not settled |
| Call for additional signature schemes | On 14 May 2026 NIST announced that nine candidates advance to the third round (NIST IR 8610) | A separate call is selecting backups to ML-DSA or schemes for special uses | Selection in progress |
| NIST IR 8547 Transition plan | Draft. Released 12 November 2024. Comments closed 10 January 2025. No final version appears in the list on the check date | A plan for moving away from quantum-vulnerable algorithms. In the draft's table, 112-bit-strength RSA and elliptic-curve signatures are "deprecated" after 2030 and "disallowed" after 2035, and 128-bit and above are "disallowed" after 2035 | A draft. NIST's PQC page says NIST plans to deprecate and ultimately remove quantum-vulnerable algorithms from its standards by 2035 |
* "Deprecated" means the algorithm may still be used but moving off it is advised. "Disallowed" means NIST's standards no longer permit it (definitions from the IR 8547 draft). U.S. National Security Memorandum 10 (NSM-10) sets a goal of mitigating "as much of the quantum risk as is feasible by 2035" for federal systems, and NIST's 2035 date is aligned with that goal Sourced.
When you read that "NIST has set the standard," note that only three are final: FIPS 203, 204 and 205. FIPS 206, HQC and the 2030 and 2035 dates in IR 8547 are, on the check date, still drafts or documents not yet published Not yet confirmed. Draft dates can change. Before using any of this in a product or plan, check NIST's pages for the latest status.
3-2. Measurement research, and links to industry and manufacturing
| Activity | Timing and scale | What it involves |
|---|---|---|
| Quantum measurement and basic research | Since the early 1990s | Quantum effects set the limits on how precisely anything can be measured, so NIST, as a measurement agency, studies quantum measurement standards. It developed early quantum logic gates, single-photon detectors and cryogenic technology. Much of the work is done in joint institutes: JILA (with the University of Colorado), the Joint Quantum Institute and the Joint Center for Quantum Information and Computer Science (with the University of Maryland) |
| Quantum Economic Development Consortium (QED-C) | Set up in 2019 with SRI International | An industry consortium created in response to the National Quantum Initiative Act. NIST said in June 2026 that participants include "essentially all major commercial developers" of quantum technologies in the United States, plus a growing number of end users |
| Quantum Manufacturing Engineering Center (QMEC) | Announced 29 June 2026. NIST plans an initial investment of US$20 million | A center that SRI International is establishing to speed up the manufacture of quantum components and systems. It targets enabling technologies such as cryostats and lasers |
| CHIPS R&D letters of intent for quantum | 21 May 2026. A planned US$2.013 billion in total for nine companies | Letters of intent from the Department of Commerce's CHIPS Research and Development Office to two quantum foundry companies and seven quantum computing companies. The amounts are "planned funding", and the Department is to receive a minority, non-controlling equity stake in each company as a condition. They are not final agreements |
| Quantum research budget | US$8.0 million planned for FY2025 (from NIST's base research funding) | Investment in quantum information science and technology. The FY2026 quantum-specific amount does not appear in the materials we could check |
4. How far its influence reaches (powers and geography)
| Dimension | What NIST has | What it does not have |
|---|---|---|
| Powers | Authority to write and maintain PQC standards (FIPS), guidance (SP) and reports (IR). A FIPS takes effect once the Secretary of Commerce approves it. NIST is also to run validation programs that test implementations against the standards | Power to make private companies use a standard. Power to certify the performance of a quantum computer (no such provision found). Executive Order 14413 directs the Secretary of Energy, not NIST, to set up a national center to assess the performance of quantum computing systems |
| Geography and scope | U.S. federal information systems and systems run by contractors on behalf of agencies. The UK NCSC's guidance also names FIPS 203 and 204 as the algorithms that will be the most widely used | National security systems (covered by other requirements, such as the NSA's). Other countries' laws. Power to require companies abroad to adopt anything |
| Binding force | Mandatory for federal agencies, with no waivers allowed. Voluntary for private organizations. Whether a standard becomes a de facto benchmark depends on whether procurement or other rules and guidance cite it | Power to make its own standards mandatory for the private sector. We did not check individual cases of citation Not yet confirmed |
| Size | About 3,400 staff and about 2,700 associates. Enacted FY2026 budget of US$1.8471 billion (US$843.9 million for research programs) | Headcount and budget dedicated to PQC or quantum are not in the materials we could check. A June 2025 briefing says staff were down by about 420 as of May 2025 |
5. Companies and organizations it works with
| Organization | Relationship | What the primary sources confirm |
|---|---|---|
| SRI International | QED-C and QMEC | Set up QED-C with NIST in 2019, and agreed in June 2026 to establish QMEC (NIST announcement) |
| IBM, GlobalFoundries | Recipients of letters of intent as the two quantum foundry companies | The letters of 21 May 2026. IBM is planned to receive US$1 billion (for a new foundry subsidiary making superconducting wafers for quantum use), and GlobalFoundries US$375 million |
| Rigetti Computing, Quantinuum, D-Wave Quantum, PsiQuantum, Diraq, Atom Computing, Infleqtion | Recipients of letters of intent as the seven quantum computing companies | The same letters. Planned amounts are up to US$100 million each (up to US$38 million for Diraq). These overlap with the companies profiled in this series |
| National Security Agency (NSA) | A separate track of requirements | National security systems are outside FIPS. See our NSA profile |
| University joint institutes | Joint research | University of Colorado (JILA) and University of Maryland (the Joint Quantum Institute and others) |
6. Outlook
| What can be read from the sources | Supporting primary information | Type |
|---|---|---|
| If IR 8547 is finalized, the 2030 and 2035 dates become the confirmed retirement plan for federal standards. The dates or scope could also change from the draft | The draft's table contains the 2030 and 2035 dates. NIST's PQC page already says NIST will deprecate and ultimately remove quantum-vulnerable algorithms from its standards by 2035, citing the IR 8547 timeline. No final version appears in the list on the check date | Inference |
| Standard documents for FIPS 206 and HQC will be added | NIST's pages say FALCON will be published as FIPS 206 and that HQC was selected in March 2025. Neither appears as a draft in the lists on the check date | Not yet confirmed (timing not found) |
| The CHIPS R&D letters of intent may change in terms or amount before they become final agreements | The announcement says "letters of intent" and "planned funding" and does not describe final agreements | Not yet confirmed |
| The quantum plans assigned to the Secretary of Commerce (encouraging private-sector adoption of standards, analysis of supply chains, and a plan that may include advance market commitments) may be carried out largely by NIST | Sections 4(d), 5(b) and 6(a) of Executive Order 14413 direct the Secretary of Commerce to develop plans. NIST's QMEC announcement says it advances the order's goals. The order does not say which unit will do the work | Inference |
| The effect of the bill to reauthorize the National Quantum Initiative Act on NIST's quantum budget | We could not confirm the bill's status on Congress's website | Not yet confirmed |
7. Glossary
- Post-quantum cryptography (PQC)
- Cryptography that relies on math that is hard for both today's computers and future quantum computers. It is separate from "quantum cryptography", which uses quantum properties (NIST publishes a separate explainer).
- FIPS
- Federal Information Processing Standard. A standard that applies to U.S. federal information systems and is approved by the Secretary of Commerce.
- ML-KEM / ML-DSA / SLH-DSA
- The algorithms in FIPS 203, 204 and 205: module-lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism, module-lattice-based digital signature algorithm, and stateless hash-based digital signature algorithm. ML-KEM shares keys, and the other two sign data.
- National security systems
- U.S. government systems that handle national security information (defined in 44 U.S.C. 3552). They are outside FIPS.
- Letter of intent
- A document stating an intention to provide funding. It is not a final agreement and is settled through negotiation.
- QED-C
- Quantum Economic Development Consortium, an industry consortium that NIST and SRI International set up in 2019.
8. References
- NIST About NIST (founded 1901, part of the Department of Commerce; checked 15 October 2026). https://www.nist.gov/about-nist
- NIST Work with NIST (about 3,400 staff, about 2,700 associates, sites; updated 30 September 2026). https://www.nist.gov/about-nist/work-nist
- NIST NIST Budget Update (27 March 2026; enacted FY2026 total of US$1,847.1 million and research programs of US$843.9 million). https://www.nist.gov/document/budget-updates-and-discussion-vcat-march-2026
- NIST NIST Budget Update (11 June 2025; US$8.0 million planned for quantum information science, staff down by about 420 as of May 2025). https://www.nist.gov/document/budget-updates-and-discussion-0
- NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography (CSRC project page: the three standards of August 2024, the IR 8547 reference, the selection of FALCON and HQC; checked 15 October 2026). https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography
- NIST FIPS 203, Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard (publication date and the note of 17 November 2025). https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final
- NIST FIPS 203 full text, PDF (approving authority, applicability, private-sector adoption, waiver procedure, exclusion of national security systems). https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.203.pdf
- NIST FIPS 204, Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (publication date and the note of 31 July 2026). https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final
- NIST FIPS 205, Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard (publication date). https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/205/final
- NIST PQC Standardization Process (FALCON in development as FIPS 206, HQC selection date; updated 5 August 2026). https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/post-quantum-cryptography-standardization
- NIST PQC News and Updates (SP 800-227, draft SP 800-230, IR 8610, IR 8545, and the date of the IR 8547 draft). https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/news
- NIST PQC Publications (status and date of each document; IR 8547 is a draft on the check date). https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/publications
- NIST NIST IR 8547 (Initial Public Draft), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (12 November 2024, comment deadline). https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8547/ipd
- NIST NIST IR 8547 draft, PDF (the 2030 and 2035 table, the NSM-10 quotation on 2035, the definitions of "deprecated" and "disallowed"). https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2024/NIST.IR.8547.ipd.pdf
- NIST SP 800-227, Recommendations for Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms (final, 18 September 2025). https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/227/final
- NIST CSRC list of FIPS (current status of FIPS; no FIPS 206 draft listed; checked 15 October 2026). https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips
- NIST What Is Post-Quantum Cryptography? (how quantum computers affect current cryptography, lattices and hash functions). https://www.nist.gov/cybersecurity/what-post-quantum-cryptography
- NIST Quantum information science (NIST's role, joint institutes, QED-C; checked 15 October 2026). https://www.nist.gov/quantum-information-science
- NIST NIST Launches Center to Drive the Manufacture of Quantum Technologies (29 June 2026; QMEC, planned initial investment of US$20 million, QED-C). https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2026/06/nist-launches-center-drive-manufacture-quantum-technologies
- NIST / Department of Commerce Department of Commerce Announces Letters of Intent With 9 Companies for $2 Billion to Accelerate U.S. Leadership in Quantum Computing (21 May 2026; CHIPS R&D Office letters of intent). https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2026/05/department-commerce-announces-letters-intent-9-companies-2-billion
- The White House Executive Order 14413, Ushering in the Next Frontier of Quantum Innovation (22 June 2026; directions to the Secretaries of Commerce and Energy). https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/06/ushering-in-the-next-frontier-of-quantum-innovation/
- UK NCSC Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (reference to FIPS 203 and 204, standardized by NIST in 2024; checked 15 October 2026). https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/pqc-migration-timelines
9. Claim-to-source audit
| Claim in the text | Type | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Founded 1901, agency of the Department of Commerce, sites | Sourced | Reference 1 https://www.nist.gov/about-nist |
| About 3,400 staff and about 2,700 associates | Sourced | Reference 2 https://www.nist.gov/about-nist/work-nist |
| FY2026 enacted budget of US$1,847.1 million, research programs of US$843.9 million | Sourced | Reference 3 https://www.nist.gov/document/budget-updates-and-discussion-vcat-march-2026 |
| US$8.0 million planned for quantum information science in FY2025; staff down by about 420 | Sourced | Reference 4 https://www.nist.gov/document/budget-updates-and-discussion-0 |
| The three standards of August 2024, FIPS 206 in development, selection of HQC, NCCoE migration project, removal by 2035 | Sourced | Reference 5 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography |
| Publication date of FIPS 203 (13 August 2024) and the note of 17 November 2025 | Sourced | Reference 6 https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final |
| Approval by the Secretary of Commerce, application to federal information systems, exclusion of national security systems, private-sector adoption, no waivers, the "believed to be secure" wording | Sourced | Reference 7 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.203.pdf |
| Publication date of FIPS 204 and the note of 31 July 2026 | Sourced | Reference 8 https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final |
| Publication date of FIPS 205 | Sourced | Reference 9 https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/205/final |
| FALCON in development as FIPS 206; HQC selected on 11 March 2025 | Sourced | Reference 10 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/post-quantum-cryptography-standardization |
| SP 800-227 (18 September 2025), draft SP 800-230 (13 April 2026, deadline 12 June), IR 8610 (14 May 2026, nine candidates), the 2016 call | Sourced | Reference 11 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/news |
| IR 8547 is a draft on the check date | Sourced | Reference 12 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/publications |
| Release date of the IR 8547 draft (12 November 2024) and comment deadline (10 January 2025) | Sourced | Reference 13 https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8547/ipd |
| The 2030 and 2035 table, the NSM-10 date of 2035, the definitions of "deprecated" and "disallowed" | Sourced | Reference 14 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2024/NIST.IR.8547.ipd.pdf |
| SP 800-227 is final (18 September 2025) | Sourced | Reference 15 https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/227/final |
| No FIPS 206 draft appears in the list of FIPS | Sourced | Reference 16 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips |
| How quantum computers affect current cryptography, lattices and hash functions, the field being at an early stage | Sourced | Reference 17 https://www.nist.gov/cybersecurity/what-post-quantum-cryptography |
| NIST's role in quantum measurement, joint institutes, QED-C, research since the early 1990s | Sourced | Reference 18 https://www.nist.gov/quantum-information-science |
| QMEC (planned initial investment of US$20 million), QED-C founded in 2019 and its participants | Sourced | Reference 19 https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2026/06/nist-launches-center-drive-manufacture-quantum-technologies |
| CHIPS R&D letters of intent (nine companies, US$2.013 billion in total, minority equity stakes as a condition) | Sourced | Reference 20 https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2026/05/department-commerce-announces-letters-intent-9-companies-2-billion |
| Directions in Sections 4(d), 4(e), 5(b) and 6(a) of Executive Order 14413 | Sourced | Reference 21 https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/06/ushering-in-the-next-frontier-of-quantum-innovation/ |
| The UK NCSC names FIPS 203 and 204 as the algorithms that will be the most widely used | Sourced | Reference 22 https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/pqc-migration-timelines |
| The four-type grouping of institutions | Our calculation | This article's own grouping |
| When the FIPS 206 and HQC standard documents will appear, whether the letters of intent become final agreements, the effect of the reauthorization bill | Not yet confirmed | Not in References 5, 10, 16 or 20, or could not be confirmed on Congress's website. This article does not estimate them |
| Headcount and budget dedicated to PQC or quantum; the FY2026 quantum-specific budget | Not yet confirmed | Not in References 2 to 4. This article does not estimate them |
| Two items in the outlook in Section 6 (finalization of IR 8547, and who carries out the Commerce plans) | Inference | This article's reading of References 13, 14 and 21 |
Last updated 15 October 2026 / Troy Technical
Figures and names come from the websites and standards documents of NIST and the Department of Commerce, a U.S. executive order and UK NCSC guidance. Standards, budgets and organization change quickly, so the check date (15 October 2026) is stated throughout. Items marked "Inference" are this article's reading of the primary information, not statements by NIST.
